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1. Our activities center on the fight for the unity of Germany. In this connection the resolution of the Cominform Bureau and Stalin's telegram to Minister President Grotewohl are of decisive importance. Regarding this issue there has been a regrettable yielding on the part of the KPD in Western Germany who speak of the unity of Germany, but who are prone to omit the word "democratic".
2. The economic policy in Western Germany leads to the ruin of the poorest segment of its population. Also the peasants are pressed hard. As evidenced by the peasants' congress in summer 1949, they are prepared to wage active warfare against American policy. The bourgeoisie also shares in the common suffering and this despite the fact that the Americans are pouring money into their West German aggression base. This latter circumstance should not be overlooked.
3. It is the economic situation on which we must base our efforts to win over the broad masses, including parts of the bourgeoisie. This, we must concede, is a contradiction in terms. On the one hand we state that we are prepared to ally ourselves with non-democrats, on the other hand we speak of the National Front of the democratic Germany. But this very contradiction corresponds to the true situation, because the historical truth is that the fight against America can be waged only on a democratic basis. Thus even anti-democratic elements can be rallied to the democratic camp via the National Front.

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There is of course a limit to the right beyond which we cannot go. Hedler and Remer can not belong to the National Front. There were protests from the nationalist camp directed against the occurrences in Watenstedt-Salzgitter, but we should not forget that it is this very nationalist camp against which the fight of the National Front is aimed. In the last analysis it is the number of workers and peasants encompassed by the National Front which determines its strength. We at one time used to favor a tendency to lean on people from the right in building up the National Front. In this connection mention should be made of Noack who is now attempting to paralyze us. Our main task is to drive a wedge into the reformist trade unions and to weld the working population into a system of unified action. We have learned that this is more important than to rest our cause on a circle of intellectuals about whom we do not know where they will stand tomorrow.

4. In evolving our tactics in Western Germany, it is of importance to cast the National Front into many moulds. That will make it impossible for the Americans to drive the National Front movement into illegality. The firmest foundation of the National Front is the German Democratic Republic.
5. In the reorganization of the peoples' committees (for unity and a just peace) some mistakes have been made which will have to be corrected. The main difficulty was to limit these committees with the performance of practical work. Some of them engaged in local policy functions. The classical case is that of the town of Gadebusch where the committee was responsible for the construction of a public toilet. As regards local policies the bourgeois parties display special zeal, their intent being to divert attention from political tasks and to torpedo the economic plan, thereby hoping to discredit the SED in the eyes of the masses. In some localities a system of dual administration has emerged. A further failing of the committee is that the working class does not occupy a dominant position. In the district committees there are only 13% workers as against 5% peasants, 50% employees, 12% artisans and employers. The composition of the committees is to be readjusted as quickly as possible.
6. The main task of the German Democratic Republic is to fulfill the 2-year plan by the time the next party conference convenes in July 1950. In order to accomplish this, the following difficulties have to be overcome:
 - a. Plan discipline will have to be enforced by passing strict laws;
 - b. Party organizations are to be prohibited from meddling in the management of business;
 - c. Red tape in the administration is to be suppressed (many comrades shirk responsibility).
7. In the agricultural sector it is contemplated to do away with rationing, with the exception of meats and fats. The farmers' delivery quota will be raised and consequently there will be less of an uncontrolled margin (Freie Spitze). The Party has decided to reduce prices for the uncontrolled margin. Consequently the farmers will get less money. At the same time we shall have to do everything within our power not to jeopardize our alliance with the farmers. Food prices shall have to be raised again. The Parteivorstand has, however, decided to do this only after the elections. Our tactic to raise prices and at the same time to improve the quality of goods has been a success. That is the way we shall do it in the future.

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8. As a result of the elections on 15 October there will be no change in actual power (reale Machtverhaeltnisse). The elections are merely designed to aid our fight for unity and to create a stable basis for tasks to come. Thus far everything is temporary, with the exception of Wilhelm Pieck who has been elected for four years. On 15 October we shall have to win a great political battle. What can befall us? 1) A small turnout; 2) Too many no-votes; 3) Too many invalid votes. The enemy is still ensconced in our committees and no systematic fight is being waged against him as yet. We still lack in ideological clarity.
9. Our election tactic is as follows: We must win over everybody for a joint election program. The question of a unified list (Einheitsliste) is not as yet on the agenda. Once we have agreed on a common platform, technical and organizational problems can easily be disposed of. Lohagen, returning from the conference of the Parteivorstand, the same evening grabbed a microphone and started propagandizing the unified list. This has been exceptionally damaging to the Party. Since this question had not been broached to the bloc parties, this put us in a very awkward position. This has to be straightened out and the question of the unified list will be set in motion from the ground up only from middle of April on.
- Comment: The Lohagen incident is known among usually well informed Party circles to have interfered with the Party's time schedule. This notwithstanding, the middle of April has been set as the date on which a "spontaneous groundswell" originating with the shop groups and mass organizations for unified election lists will be set in motion.
10. Our main task is at present to convince the masses of the rightness of our policy. The report of Herbert Warncke on the FDGB elections has pointed out to us that a lot remains to be done in the way of political work among the working class. Most of all we shall have to wage a fight for the working class. Only after we have gained the support of the working class can we go ahead and form an alliance with the farmers. Under no circumstances must we forget the four million workers in private industry and trade, whom we have neglected criminally. The 15 October is consequently for us an exceedingly important day of decision. The enemy is set to provoke us at any cost into carrying out actions similar to those in 1947 in Czechoslovakia. We do not want that. We want an honest political victory. Naturally we shall have to drag the bourgeois parties along with us. That is comprehensible. Our Party is the leading political force.
11. It is our Party that will have to do the deciding work at the elections. This entails first and foremost that we have to raise the political and ideological level of Party training at this time. That is very important for the time to come and for the future. A thorough application of the experiences we have gathered during our journey to the USSR ** will aid us in this objective. The Politburo has decided to promulgate a reorganization of the party schooling system to become effective on 1 November 1950. First of all we shall train leading functionaries. What has happened in the editorial staff of the Einheit points a lesson. There alien, anti-Leninist doctrines had embedded themselves. Both Joseph Winternitz and Klaus Zweiling*** had to be relieved of their functions. The pivotal duty of the Marx-Stalin-Lenin Institute will be to make the writings of Stalin accessible to everybody. There is still too much liberalism in the Karl Marx Academy. The case of Wolfgang Leonhard (an instructor of the academy who fled to Yugoslavia) has not as yet been studied in all its implications.

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12. Among some of our comrades the erroneous view still prevails that the Whitsuntide rally is an FDJ affair. Far be it from me to deny that the FDJ too has something to do with the Whitsuntide rally. However, it constitutes first and foremost an important step toward the events of 15 October, a curtain-raiser (Aufakt). I must stress again and again that the rally is meant to be a peaceful demonstration for peace. Kuba's poem, "The FDJ storms Berlin", and the statements made by some FDJ functionaries are altogether out of order. Naturally we shall for purposes of the rally consider Berlin a unit. As to the organizational details of the rally, however, our decisions will be taken only at the very last moment. That entirely depends on the political situation we are faced with just before Whitsuntide.

Comments

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- * A report to the effect that Celssner has not been seen since early March 1950 and that great anxiety exists in the Karl Marx Academy concerning his whereabouts (Telegraf, 26 March edition), is absolutely without foundation.
- * Celssner visited Party schools in the USSR 28 January - 17 February 1950.
- ** Joserh Winternitz, the head of the Marx-Engels-Lenin Institute, was relieved of his position in early March 1950. In an article which appeared in Einheit, a monthly magazine devoted to the theory of scientific socialism, Winternitz had quoted extensively from Stalin's introductory remarks to the German edition of his collected works. Stalin was quoted as stating that during the years from 1901 to 1907 he became an "apprentice of revolution", that in those days he gravitated more to the practical organization of the Party and of mass organizations than to the theory of socialism, that he had lacked theoretical schooling and that vis-à-vis theoretical problems his attitude was that of an "insouciant practitioner". (Issue No. 2, 1950, page 161). Despite the fact that all Winternitz had done was to quote Stalin's words, he was accused of having defamed Stalin by casting doubt on the historical fact that he at all times had been the undisputed theoretician of the Party. Klaus Zweiling, the chief editor of Einheit, also had to go, because in passing Winternitz' MS without sufficient scrutiny he had betrayed a shocking lack of vigilance.